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Chapter 7
Identity Management  
and Control for Clouds
In the last few chapters we covered the technologies, usage models, and capabilities that 
are required to enable trusted infrastructure in the cloud–one of the foundation pillars for 
trusted clouds. We looked at the concepts, solution architectures, and ISV components 
that establish and propagate platform trust, attestation, and boundary control, all of 
which are required to enable the trusted clouds. The other foundational pillar to enable 
them is identity management, and that is the focus on this chapter.
Identity management encompasses the management of individual identities and 
their authentication, authorization, roles, and privileges and permissions within or across 
system and enterprise boundaries, with the goal of increasing security and productivity 
while decreasing cost, downtime, and repetitive tasks. Identity management thus 
constitutes an essential capability for attaining trusted clouds. From a cloud security 
perspective, and given the distributed nature of the cloud, questions like, “How do I 
control passwords and access tokens in the cloud?” and “How do I federate identity in the 
cloud?” are very real and thorny ones for cloud providers and subscribers. In this chapter, 
we will provide a broad introduction to identity, survey the challenges and requirements 
for identity management systems, and describe a set of technologies from Intel and 
McAfee that address identity requirements.
The emerging cloud infrastructure connects remote parties worldwide through 
the use of large-scale networks and through a diverse and complex set of hardware and 
software technologies. Activities in various domains, such as e-commerce, entertainment, 
social networking, collaboration, and health care are increasingly being implemented 
by diverse sets of resources and services. These resources and services are engaged at 
various levels within those domains. The interactions between different parties at remote 
locations may be (and sometimes should be) based on the information that’s needed to 
carry out specific transactions with little knowledge about each other beyond that.
To better support these activities and collaborations, it is essential there be an 
information technology infrastructure with a simple-to-use identity management system. 
We expect, for example, that personal preferences and profiles of individuals be readily 
available as a cloud service when shopping over the Internet or with the use of mobile 
devices. Extensive use of cloud services involving sensitive computation and storage 
should be done without the need for individuals to repeatedly enter user credentials. In 
this scenario, the technology for digital identity management (IdM) is fundamental in 
customizing the user experience, underpinning accountability in the transactions, and 
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complying with regulatory controls. For this technology to fully deploy its potential, it is 
crucial we investigate and understand the concept of digital identity. This in turn helps in 
developing solutions for the protection of digital identity in IdM systems, solutions that 
ensure such information is not misused and individuals’ privacy is guaranteed. Moreover, 
several strong authentication techniques aimed at protecting digital identity from misuse 
and access control rely on multi-factor identity verification and strong identity factors.
Phillip Windley defines digital identity as “the data that uniquely describes a person 
or a thing and contains information about the subject’s relationships.”1 We like this 
definition because it allows for practical ways to assert identity. Identity may simply be 
a collection of attributes that together disambiguates someone, or it may be a digital 
identifier with known unique properties.
Note that identity plays a role in many contexts, interactions, and transactions of 
everyday life. Examples of “contexts” include personal, social, work, government and 
e-commerce. The interpretation and view of the same identity information may vary 
based on other contextual information, thus increasing the complexity of the problem of 
managing such identities. Moreover, the policies, control, and management of the same 
identity information may differ based on:
Identities owned and controlled by users or data subjects•	
Identities controlled by third parties or cloud service providers •	
but known to data subjects
Identities controlled by third parties, such as credit rating •	
agencies and unknown to data subjects
Analysis of the multi-dimensional aspects of the management of identity 
information and other related details regarding IdM components is important while 
assessing which identity solution best fits consumers’ or business users’ interaction with 
cloud services. In this chapter we focus on methodologies of IdM, and especially Intel 
technologies. We will not explore why users submit or share information in the various 
mentioned ways and for what purposes. That limitation notwithstanding, such legal, 
social, and behavioral contexts may be important when considering the management and 
use of identity information.
Identity Challenges
There are a number of obligatory considerations in the architecture of almost any identity 
system. These include issue identity, identity usage, identity modification, and identity 
revocation. Based on the simple identity credential lifecycle illustrated in Figure 7-1, 
we can identify some general shortcomings in current approaches to managing identity 
information.
1Phillip J. Windley, Digital Identity O’Reilly Media, 2005), 8–9.
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A limitation of current systems is that no information is provided about whether 
the strong and weak identifiers being enrolled and stored at the identity provider (IdPs) 
have been verified to be correct with respect to validity and ownership, as well as any 
indication of the strength of this verification. If an IdP has such information, then 
service providers are in a position to make a more accurate judgment concerning the 
trustworthiness of such identity information.
Furthermore, most IdM systems lack flexible enrollment mechanisms for the 
individuals who want to enroll in their systems. Enrollment can be in person at a physical 
location of an IdP or online. Current systems, however, do not provide alternative 
mechanisms for individuals to enroll. Moreover, the types of identity attributes that can 
be enrolled in most systems are restricted, based upon the nature of the IdP organization.
Identity Usages
A major drawback of current systems is that no specific techniques are provided to 
protect against the misuse of identity attributes stored at the IdPs and service providers. 
Even the notion of misuse is still being investigated and the solutions are in early stage of 
maturity. By “misuse” we refer to when dishonest individuals register fake attributes or 
impersonate other individuals of the federation, leading to the threat of identity theft.
To mitigate this threat, an upcoming trend is to require strong authentication. Strong 
authentication often refers to systems that require multiple factors, possibly issued by 
different sources, to identify users when they access certain services and applications. 
However, current approaches to strong authentication, such as those deployed by banks, 
enterprises, and government institutions, are neither flexible nor fine-grained. In many 
cases, strong authentication simply means requiring two forms of identity tokens—for 
example, password and biometric. Through prior knowledge of these token requirements, 
an adversary can steal and compromise that required identity information. Moreover, if 
the same tokens are repeatedly used for strong authentication at various service providers, 
Figure 7-1. Shortcomings of current federated IdM approaches in the credential lifecycle
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then the chances of these tokens being compromised increase. Yet, individuals should be 
able to choose any combination of identity attributes to perform strong authentication, 
provided the authentication policies defined by the verifying party are satisfied.
A recurrent issue in identity usage is the inability of some individuals to disclose 
minimal identity data about themselves to the service provider and IdPs, as per required 
to obtain the service requested. Digital identifiers have uniqueness properties that 
disambiguate someone or something within some domain of reference. For example, 
virtually every average-size company has two or more people with the same first and last 
names. Smaller companies have fewer name–space collisions; larger companies have 
more. To minimize the occurrence of these name–space collisions, identity management 
systems typically create unique digital identifiers. Interestingly, the identity management 
system could create a digital identifier that is globally unique, meaning that the identifier is 
not only unique within the company, but also may be unique at every other organization. 
This suggests that globally unique identifiers can be used to track and correlate activities 
between multiple organizations. Of course, such identifiers would be more than minimal, 
able to disambiguate individuals beyond what is required for the employer’s use.
There are, likewise, several security and privacy concerns related to the extraneous 
identity information of the individuals stored at service providers and IdPs. Moreover, 
such data may be aggregated or used in a manner that could potentially violate the 
privacy requirements of those individuals.
Approaches need to be developed to address how biometric data can be used in 
an IdM system. Use of biometrics as an integral part of individual identity is gaining 
importance. At the same time, because of the nature of biometric data, it is not easy to use 
such data in a way similar to the traditional attributes. In theory, it should be possible to 
use biometric data together with other identity attributes to provide greater protection 
against identity attribute misuse. Biometric identifiers are designed to be globally unique. 
DNA biometrics are universally unique—it is believed that no human being has exactly 
the same DNA sequence as any other human who has ever lived or who will ever live.2
Another type of identity data becoming increasingly important in current systems is 
that related to individuals’ histories of online activity. If this history can be verified and 
used for evaluating properties about an individual—for example, his or her reputation—then 
this data becomes part of that individual’s identity. Consider a scenario in which an 
individual frequently buys books from an online store. This purchasing history can be 
encoded as an identity attribute of that individual, which in turn can be used to evaluate 
the person’s reputation as a buyer. This history-based data needs to be better supported 
in current IdM systems. Companies like Amazon, Netflix, and Apple are using these 
types of attributes to classify customer buying habits and nature, in order to present a 
customized shopping experience.
Identity Modification
There are different approaches to take when it comes to finding mechanisms for the 
notification of changes in attributes. However, further investigation is required to 
develop flexible mechanisms for updating or modifying user-controlled enrolled identity 
2Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security Internet service. http://www.faqs.org/
espionage/De-Eb/DNA-Sequences-Unique.html#b.
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attributes. As the information is shared within the federation, updates performed on one 
system do not ensure consistency across the federation. Additionally, systems may fail to 
prevent malicious updates by attackers impersonating honest individuals.
Identity Revocation
Current federated IdM systems lack practical and effective revocation mechanisms. To 
enable consistency and maintain correctness of identity information, revocation should 
be feasible. Revocation feasibility for biometrics can be problematic, though. People 
can’t simply change their fingerprints, irises, or DNA. Revocation in provider-centric 
systems, in which the IdP provides the required credential to the user each time, is 
relatively simple to achieve, however. A cryptographic digital identity can be mapped to 
a biometric identifier to create a credential with a manageable lifecycle. Such credentials 
are typically short term, and cannot be used without consulting the issuer again. If, 
however, the credentials are stored with the user, such as a long-term credential issued by 
the appropriate authority, then building a revocation system becomes more challenging 
and critical.
Identity Management System Requirements
In emerging paradigms of identity systems (such as user-centric identity) there are 
several distinct properties of the identity attributes that must be maintained. A key 
property is that of user control. While reasoning about the security and privacy properties 
of user control, we refer to the OECD countries. The OECD guidelines are widely accepted 
and they are the cornerstone of fair information practices and regulations designed to 
protect personal information around the world. In addition, Cameron’s Laws of Identity 
are a recent set of prevalent guidelines regarding digital identity management.3 They 
both aim at explaining the successes and failures of digital identity systems. In addition, 
design principles and rules to achieve several security and dependability properties 
are included. Figure 7-2 shows the properties of our taxonomy related to user control, 
illustrated as nodes. Taken together, these basic properties define what we mean by 
security and privacy in our solution.
3http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms996456.aspx.
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Basic User Control Properties
The basic properties related to the identity attributes either apply to the entire IdM 
system, to transactions in the system, or to the identity information and credentials of 
the entities involved. Although this classification is not exclusive, the semantics of the 
properties highlight which of the three they are relevant to. Table 7-1 briefly describes 
these properties.
Figure 7-2. Taxonomy of user control properties for identity attributes
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Table 7-1. Basic Properties Achieving Security and Privacy
Property Description
Confidentiality This deals with the protection of information from 
unauthorized disclosure. This property applies to identity 
information and transactions in the system. Identity 
information should be accessible only by the intended 
recipients.
Revocation Revocation of identity information is required to maintain the 
validity of information in the system. It should ensure that once 
invalid information is recognized, it is not used for identity 
verification purposes.
Integrity This requires data not be altered in an unauthorized way.
Unlinkability Ability to unlink two or more users or transactions so that an 
attacker, after having observed the transactions, cannot gain 
additional information by linking onto those transactions. 
Unlinkability prevents (illegitimate) merging of user profiles.
User Choice The individual can choose among multiple IdPs and determine 
which attributes to release.
Verifiability The individual can verify that the IdP provides the correct 
identity data about him or herself and according to that 
individual’s intention. As such, an individual giving consent for 
what data is revealed, for what purpose, and to whom means 
that the individual’s view of the transaction corresponds  
to the actual transaction and that the individual has agreed to 
execution of the transaction.
Non-replay This prevents unauthorized parties from successfully using an 
individual’s identity data to conduct new transactions.  
Non-replay is one prerequisite for obtaining the  
non-repudiation property.
Non-repudiation The sending of non-repudiatable identity data cannot be 
denied by its sender and the ownership of the identity data 
cannot be denied.
Stealing Protection This concerns the protection against unauthorized entities 
illegitimately retrieving an individual’s data items. Stealing 
protection is required to achieve properties such as  
non-repudiation.
Selective release Identity information can be released at a fine-granular level, 
as controlled by the individual. In this way, an individual can 
provide only the identity information that needs to be released 
for a service, without having to release additional information.
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Key Requirements for an Identity Management 
Solution
The key requirements for an identity management system to ensure security and privacy 
of the identity data are as follows.
Accountability
Accountability refers to an ability to hold entities responsible for their actions in user 
transactions and for their use of identity information at the service provider and IdP. IdM 
systems have typically been focused on underpinning the accountability in business 
relationships and checking adherence to regulatory controls. In user-centric systems, 
the identity information of a user may be provided via the user’s client. Therefore, it is 
required that, in addition to guaranteeing the integrity of the identity data, there should 
be accountability in providing such data. Accountability also becomes a significant 
issue if the user is to stay anonymous, as accountability and anonymity are, per se, 
contradictory properties. Nevertheless, conditional release of identity information 
can help in obtaining accountability in anonymous transactions. The eighth OECD 
accountability principle is devoted to understanding accountability, especially as it 
relates to privacy.
Notification
Notification Identity management (IdM):notification is desirable as a means for 
improving security by enhanced user control. Users should be able to receive and retrieve 
notifications regarding the usage of their credentials, so as to identify security breaches, 
and to estimate the extent of their compromised user identity information previously 
shared with external entities. It is desirable to allow users to collect data, whether under 
receive (push model) or retrieve (pull model) notifications regarding the usage of identity 
data. The sixth and seventh OECD principles of openness and individual participation 
can potentially be satisfied using comprehensive notification mechanisms.
Note ■  Privacy legislation often requires notification of individuals impacted by release of 
privacy-sensitive personally identifiable information (PII). Identity credentials may be  
considered PII. notification also helps individuals manage their privacy.
Anonymity
In transactions, anonymity deals with subjects remaining anonymous within an 
anonymity set—that is, with not being identifiable within some context or “set.” In 
this context, something is more anonymous when it can be hidden in a population of 
otherwise indistinguishable members. A white sheep in a herd of white sheep is more 
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anonymous than a black sheep in that same herd of white sheep. Thus, anonymity is a 
specific notion related to data minimization, obtainable when the released attributes are 
not identifying the user.
Anonymity is supported by unlinkable transactions. Without such unlinkability, the 
anonymity set shrinks quickly when executing several transactions. Pseudonymity, or the 
use of pseudonyms as user identifiers, is a concept related to anonymity.4 It plays a critical 
role in providing unlinkability and data minimization. There has been extensive work on 
the concept of pseudonymity, from both conceptual and implementation perspectives.
Note that conditional anonymity—that is, anonymity that holds only as long as a 
well-defined condition has not been fulfilled—can be based on conditional release of the 
identity information. In this way, the mechanisms providing for anonymity remain useful, 
as they are complemented by mechanisms for realizing accountability.
Data Minimization
Data minimization deals with minimal data release within a transaction. This can be 
achieved by having appropriate policy system support, by having unlinkable transactions, 
and by having a data release system that allows for selective and conditional release of 
identity information. This approach corresponds to the first OECD principle relating to 
collection limitation. It is also reflected in the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
and the national data protection laws within the European Union.
Attribute Security
The attribute security property reflects a comprehensive view of the security of a user’s 
attributes. The main focus is on the correctness of attributes in the view of a service 
provider, meaning that the attributes belong to the person executing the transactions. 
This requires the attribute information to be integrity protected. Additionally, protections 
against stealing, and mechanisms to prevent sharing must be in place in order to 
stop another person from maliciously impersonating a user’s identity. Furthermore, 
revocation of identity information must be feasible. Attributes in certain cases must be 
kept confidential with respect to parties other than the ones involved in the transaction.
Attribute Privacy
Attribute privacy refers to giving the user control over the attribute data. This is supported 
by system assurance and by allowing for user-chosen IdPs. Both those properties 
account for user-centric decisions regarding which IdP to trust. Anonymity and 
dependent properties very likely contribute to attribute privacy in that they help avoid 
the unnecessary release of (identifying) information. Data minimization also directly 
provides privacy.
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudonymity.
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An orthogonal property essential for reaching attribute privacy is support of privacy 
policy management, enforcement, and agreement. User control over attributed data 
helps the user remain anonymous outside the context or domain in which the identity 
is being used. Preventing disclosure of privacy sensitive information outside the context 
where it is needed is important; once this information is disclosed, it can’t be reclaimed. 
Confidentiality measures ensure that privacy-sensitive attributes are not unintentionally 
disclosed to any party.
Identity Representations and Case Studies
There are various types of identity tokens used for device and user identification and for 
access control. Key examples are illustrated in Figure 7-3. From a security perspective, 
the prevalent method of conveying identity information that is certified by a trusted third 
party is through certificates.
Figure 7-3. Types of identity tokens
Based upon the representation of certified digital identity information, the resulting 
system may or may not satisfy one or more of the properties covered in the previous 
section. In the following, we discuss technical mechanisms that can be used to obtain 
an identity management system with the properties described in our taxonomy. We 
refer to three different core mechanisms. Note that what follows is not a complete survey 
of mechanisms but, rather, focuses on the more interesting properties relevant to the 
representation of certified digital identity information.
PKI Certificates
Standard certificates, like X.509, allow, in conjunction with a private signing key, a user 
to prove that attributes have been issued to him or her. The certificate contains attributes 
and a public key signed by the IdP (the issuer of the certificate). Note that in a typical IT 
enterprise, such certificates are used for managing users and client machines in order 
to establish secure channels between two enterprise entities, for provisioning, and for 
updating user machines or profiles.
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To assert the attributes of a certificate to a relying party, the user engages in a 
challenge-response protocol with the relying party. This protocol requires the certificate 
to be sent to the relying party and a signature made with the private key. The step reveals 
all attributes of the certificate to the recipient. Technically, certificates are based on 
standard digital signature schemes such as RSA and are represented by standards like 
X.509,5 which define the formats of the certificates.
Traditional certificate-based technologies allow for constructing systems in which 
a certificate is issued once and can be used repeatedly by users to reveal the attributes 
contained in the certificate. Thus, this technology allows for off-line IdPs. The tokens are 
generated by the user without involvement of the IdP, making this method flexible with 
respect to this aspect. This technology is, for example, used in multiple ID card proposals 
and public key infrastructure-based systems.
Security and Privacy Discussion
In the discussion of security requirements, note that the integrity of such schemes 
is accounted for by the user attributes being included in the certificate signed by the 
IdP, using standard signature schemes, and e being provided each time the attributes 
are asserted to a relying party. Confidentiality of attribute information is achieved by 
using encryption schemes in conjunction with public key infrastructure (PKI). Stealing 
prevention methods for standard certificate systems target protection of the master 
private key, as the certificates are made available to relying parties anyway. The following 
mechanisms can be used, also in a combined fashion:
Binding all certificates to one master private key of the user and •	
mandating appropriate protection of this key—for example, in 
a hardware token. As this requires the hardware token be used 
in each transaction, the portability of such tokens becomes 
important.
Applying operating system mechanisms to prevent a user from •	
sharing his or her key.
Using multi-factor authentication makes it harder to share the •	
token—for example, if it is derived from the biometrics of the user.
Finally, revocability can be achieved by the prominent mechanism of certificate 
revocation lists (CRLs) and associated protocols. This requires an additional protocol to 
be run in order to obtain the latest revocation list.
With respect to the privacy requirements, verifiability holds as a user can inspect the 
certificate and thus has control over the attribute information being revealed. Conditional 
release cannot be realized in the setting in which the protocols operate, as an IdP is 
not involved in the transactions. Technically, of course, protocols could be conceived 
that involve the IdP in a transaction to obtain the conditional release property, but by 
discussing this we would leave the basic paradigm of the system.
5http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509.
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Selective disclosure is not possible in a setting that uses standard certificates, as 
these certificates always have to be revealed as a whole and no subset of their attributes 
can be revealed because of the properties of the employed standard signature schemes 
like RSA or DSA. Finally, unlinkability may not be achievable in this setting. This is 
because transactions done with multiple IdPs, or multiple transactions with one IdP, are 
linkable, as the same certificate bit string is being provided in every transaction.
Limitations
The main problem with using standard user-side certificates is the lack of overall privacy 
properties, and thus the strong trust assumptions that we have to make on the relying 
parties. Assuming stronger trust in a relying party may not be realistic, relying parties may 
benefit from gathering extraneous users identity information. The U.S. National Institute 
of Science and Technology (NIST) has defined comprehensive criteria for understanding 
and evaluating identity management systems.6 Those criteria demonstrate how the 
principles of identity management may be applied when evaluating identity management 
systems for purchase or use.
Identity Federation
There are several enterprise identity usages that require nonemployee accounts, 
business-to-business (B2B) interactions, and interaction and use of data from multiple 
applications that may exist across different networks. Identity federation is a term used 
when organizations form trust relationships whereby identities or assertions of an 
identity can be shared by all applications within the federation. It is critical that business 
partners involved in a federation build a trust relationship with one another. This 
trust relationship, defined by business, technical, and legal agreements, describes the 
applications that are involved, the user profile information that is to be shared, and the 
responsibilities of all parties to manage and protect user identities.7
Several standardization initiatives for identity federation are being developed across 
the world. Among them, Kantara Initiative (http://kantarainitiative.org/)  
and WS-Federation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WS-Federation) are two 
significant efforts. These initiatives define an identity federation framework that allows 
assurance-levels mapping for various service providers. For example, the Kantara 
Identity Assurance Accreditation and Certification Program assesses applicants against 
its assessment criteria, including alignment with the NIST 800-63 Levels of Assurance 
(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63V1_0_2.pdf ) and 
it grants successful candidates of the program the right to use the Kantara Initiative 
Mark, a symbol of trustworthy identity and credential management services at specified 
assurance levels. It also collaborates with Open Identity Exchange (OIX) and other 
related initiatives to allow an interoperable digital trust framework to promote adoption 
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of standardizing the way companies share principals and machine identities among 
disparate authentication and authorization systems that cross corporate boundaries. 
This translates to mechanisms and specifications that enable federation of identity 
attributes, authentication, and authorization information, but it does not include trust 
establishment and verification protocols.
The common objectives for federation proposals have been primarily to reduce the 
number of user-business interactions and exchanges of information such that critical 
private information is used only by appropriate parties. There is a need to ensure that user 
information is available to the SPs on demand, online and with low delay. Thus, user data 
is more up to date and consistent compared to the situation where each principal has to 
maintain its data in multiple places. Federations reduce costs and redundancy because 
the member organizations do not have to acquire, store, and maintain authorization 
information about all their partners’ users. Also, both the federation initiatives try to 
preserve privacy, as only data required to use a service is transmitted to a business partner.
Single Sign-On
Single sign-on (SSO) improves security and usability. With SSO, user accounts and 
passwords are not reused across multiple sites or servers. SSO also improves usability by 
limiting the number of times the user must re-authenticate. Popular SSO systems include 
Kerberos, ActiveDirectory, SAML, and OpenID. The SSO systems work by converting the 
user authentication event into an access credential that is cryptographically protected. 
An access manager located at a remote server or within the same platform verifies the 
credential, rather than performing an authentication challenge with the user. The SSO 
credentials grant access for a period of time; that access is rescinded upon credential 
expiry. These systems make security and usability trade-offs that can be undesirable, 
however. If the credential timeout value is too long, malware can reuse the credential to 
prolong access that is otherwise unauthorized. If the timeout value is too short, the user 
must re-authenticate to continue the session.
An example of an SSO system is the McAfee Cloud SSO. It ensures that strong 
authentication is used for the customer’s cloud-based software as a service (SaaS) 
applications, and helps allow SSO access to the cloud-based applications while 
complying with enterprise security policies. This solution is flexible and permits for an 
on-premises as well as SaaS-based solution, or both (hybrid model).
Intel Identity Technologies
Intel Corporation has developed several technologies useful for implementing identity 
management systems. Hardware support is often beneficial because it presents physical 
boundaries that can inhibit or prevent compromise of the identity management system 
by malware.
Hardware Support
Intel provides hardware support to enable hardened identity technologies on Intel 
platforms. Some basic underlying capabilities as of 2013 are as follows.
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Virtualization Technology (VT)
Intel’s Virtualization Technology (VT; see Figure 7-4) creates an additional layer of 
protection between physical memory and devices beneath the operating system.8 
Virtualization can be used as a security mechanism by isolating the operating system 
and applications from hardware using a small, and therefore well-understood software 
layer, that’s also known as the hypervisor, ensures that hardware access follows some 
prescribed rules of behavior. The hypervisor implements a security policy designed to 
protect the integrity of information in memory, in peripheral devices, and in the CPU.
Figure 7-4. Intel Virtualization Technology
Intel Identity Protection Technology (IPT)
Intel’s Identity Protection Technology (IPT; see Figure 7-5) consists of several 
credentialing and credential management capabilities for client platforms.9 They are 
implemented in a security engine in hardware and offer an additional layer of security 
hardening and isolation from malware.




CHAPTER 7 ■ IdEnTITy MAnAgEMEnT And ConTRol foR Clouds 
155
•	 IPT-OTP. One-time passwords are single-use identifiers that 
cannot be anticipated or replayed by an attacker. Typically, the 
user and service provider agree to use a common “seed” from 
which a sequence of one-time passwords is generated. Keeping 
the seed secret is essential to security. IPT-OTP protects seeds in a 
hardware security engine.
•	 IPT-PKI. Public key infrastructure (PKI) is a set of hardware, 
software, people, policies, and procedures designed to create, 
manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates.10 
Certificates are identity credentials that associate an asymmetric 
key11 with an identifier. IPT-PKI is a cryptographic service provider 
that protects private asymmetric keys in a hardware security engine.
•	 IPT-PTD. In many cases, use of a credential requires user 
approval. Malware attacks that fake user approval may be a 
sufficient form of compromise to achieve the attacker’s objective. 
IPT-PTD protects the output path between the hardware security 
engine and the graphics controller. Malware may not observe 
information displayed to a user. Protected output may be used to 
protect PIN input by rearranging a PIN pad display in a random 
order. When a user inputs the PIN using the randomized PIN pad, 
malware observing the mouse clicks cannot determine which (X,Y) 
coordinates map to which PIN digit. PINs are used by IPT-PKI and 
IPT-OTP to authorize use of a credential by a specific person.
Figure 7-5. Intel Identity Protection Technology
10See Wikipedia, “Public Key Infrastructure.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Public-key_infrastructure.
11See Wikipedia, “Public Key Cryptography.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-
key_cryptography.
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•	 IPT-DeviceID. Use cases involving the computing platform when 
no user is present may require authentication. IPT-DeviceID 
associates a platform identifier with a credential. IPT-DeviceID 
protects the device credential in hardware.
Intel Security Engine
The security engine used to implement Intel’s Identity Protection Technology has several 
capabilities that may be useful for enhanced privacy protections.
•	 Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID). The EPID is an asymmetric key 
provisioned at platform manufacturing time by Intel. It can 
be used to authenticate that an Intel platform security engine 
is performing a function securely. For example, the EPID key 
may be used to digitally sign the applet running on the security 
engine to prove its integrity and validity. EPID may also be used 
to prove an Intel security engine protects an IPT-PKI key. As the 
name suggests, EPID is privacy enhanced. This means the verifier 
can tell that the endpoint is an Intel security engine, but can’t 
tell which one–even when the same platform returns a second 
time, the verifier can’t correlate the second session with the first 
session.
•	 Sigma. The Intel security engine also implements a SIGn-and-
MAc protocol (Sigma) based on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
that is signed using the EPID key. Sigma produces symmetric 
session keys for encryption and mac-ing of bulk data. Sigma 
allows a stream of data originating from the security engine to 
be transferred to a remote service provider. Sigma is useful for 
protecting logged event data, sensor input values, and configuring 
of policies.
The use of EPID and Sigma building blocks allows a client platform to interact 
securely without disclosing privacy sensitive information unnecessarily.
Intel’s Manageability Engine (ME) implements security primitives for encryption, 
key exchange, and identity protection. It is integrated into Intel’s chipsets. The ME 
(Figure 7-6) is isolated from the host operating environment and memory.
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Cloud Identity Solutions
Security services vendors such as McAfee provide a suite of security solutions for a 
wide range of enterprise and cloud-hosted services. Identity management is part of 
a comprehensive solution. Identity management services implement the credential 
lifecycle and ensure interoperability with a wide variety of services and applications.
The McAfee Cloud Ecosystem (see Figure 7-7) includes unified management, policy, 
reporting, and enterprise integration of pluggable security capabilities ranging from data 
loss prevention to web security. These capabilities are built upon an infrastructure that 
supports global threat intelligence monitoring and response, cloud-aware security, and 
enterprise-orchestrated policies. Such cloud-based security solutions offer dynamic 
protections that adjust as situational awareness changes. Cooperation among thousands 
of nodes participating in building a clearer picture of the threat landscape ensures that 
security incidents are processed and countermeasures are applied.
Figure 7-6. Intel B85 chipset containing the Intel Manageability Engine
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A cloud-based approach to security that includes identity management ensures 
that the known trusted users can be distinguished from the unknown and less trusted. 
Selection of a security services provider that implements such identity management 
comes with the implication that the provider is protecting the user’s privacy in addition to 
ensuring computing security.
Summary
Identity management is an important component of a comprehensive cloud security 
infrastructure. This infrastructure must be rooted in sound identity management 
principles that not only ensure robust control of the identity credential lifecycle but 
also satisfies users’ privacy desires. The identity management landscape is complicated 
by constant innovation and the evolution of authentication factor technology, identity 
credentials, and infrastructure investments. Complexity isn’t necessarily good for 
security and privacy protection, but it appears to be an unavoidable reality. Taking the 
time to select a competent identity management provider can be an effective strategy for 
managing this complexity.
Figure 7-7. McAfee cloud identity solution
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Computers that have deeply integrated identity protection technologies can be 
very effective in protecting user privacy and identity, while also delivering identity 
management solutions that interoperate with an already complex ecosystem of cloud 
services and that can promise continued support for an emerging Internet-of-things.
Identity management in the future holds many interesting challenges, especially 
when the Internet-of-things (IOT) is factored in.12 The IOT promises Internet connectivity 
to a host of embedded systems, building automation control, smart appliances, and 
vehicles of all kinds. Technology advances make it practical to build wireless self-
contained sensors that link directly to the Internet, feeding databases that analyze and 
infer new knowledge about the world. As people interact ever more widely with the 
world, sensors may be able to identify their unique properties using kinematics.13 In an 
IOT world, devices will come equipped with device IDs to ensure they can be managed 
and controlled by authorized servers. They will have privacy-preserving capabilities that 
respect their user’s right to privacy by filtering biometric data locally and translating it 
into digital credentials that more easily support credential lifecycle management.
In the next chapter, we focus on building and extending security, integrity, and 
confidentiality to applications and workloads that run in the cloud. As you would expect, 
the applications and workloads, which are typically packaged as virtual machines, anchor 
their integrity and trust in the chain of trust that is built with trusted compute pools and 
associated concepts and technologies that have been discussed in preceeding chapters.
12Intel adds Intelligence to Cloud for Internet of Things. http://iotinternetofthingsconference. 
com/2013/10/09/intel-adds-intelligence-to-cloud-for-internet-of-things/.
13See Wikipedia, “Gait Analysis Using Kinematics.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gait_analysis.
